Verhaltenskodex für Stimmrechtsberater

Die von der Euro­päi­schen Wert­pa­pier­auf­sichts­be­hörde (ESMA) initi­ierte Arbeit an einem Ver­hal­tens­ko­dex für Stimm­rechts­be­ra­ter zeigt erste Früchte. Der Ent­wurf eines Ver­hal­tens­ko­dex wurde vor­ge­legt: Best Prac­tice Princi­ples for Gover­nance Rese­arch Pro­vi­ders. Der Ent­wurf ist jetzt zur Kon­sul­ta­tion gestellt. Stel­lung­nah­men kön­nen bis zum 20. Dezem­ber 2013 abge­ge­ben wer­den. Nach Aus­wer­tung soll die end­gül­tige Fas­sung im Früh­jahr 2014 vor­ge­stellt wer­den.

Als neu­tra­ler Ver­tre­ter des öffent­li­chen Inter­es­ses und unab­hän­gi­ger Chair­man der Arbeits­gruppe hat Prof. Dr. Dirk Zetz­sche, LL.M. (Toronto), Pro­fes­sor für Bank- und Finanz­mark­recht in Liech­ten­stein und einer der hie­si­gen Direk­to­ren des Insti­tuts für Unter­neh­mens­rechts, an den Bera­tun­gen mit­ge­wirkt. Im Übri­gen sind sechs Ver­tre­ter von Unter­neh­men aus der Bran­che der Stimm­rechts­be­ra­ter betei­ligt.

Ein Kommentar

  1. Ich ent­schul­dige mich, aber mein Deutsch ist ein biss­chen ein­ge­rös­tet –und mein Eng­lisch auch!-

    Who’s afraid of the big, bad Proxy Advi­sor?

    Proxy advi­sors are seen by many as the spu­rious sons of an arti­fi­cial and forced share­hol­ders’ activism. They merely sell an insurance against cri­tics for the insi­tu­tio­nal share­hol­ders and making so have become law­ma­kers, empty voters and con­trol­ling share­hol­ders in the shadow, fil­led with unbe­ara­ble con­flicts of inte­rest. They seem more or less behe­mo­ths, and the poor old Boards trem­ble at the thought of them, and kneel begging for gra­cious appro­val of their fair propositions…One might say, quo­ting Cas­sius, Upon what meat doth this our Cae­sar [name you favou­rite Proxy advi­sory firm] feed, // That he is grown so great? Age, thou art shamed!”

    Let’s be serious. I think that the cor­po­ra­ti­ons are over­re­ac­ting. The real power of the Proxy advi­sors is still a mat­ter to be empi­ri­cally deter­mi­ned and pro­ved, and that is an almost impos­si­ble task: the Post hoc ergo prop­ter hoc” fall­acy does not and never will allow an exact proof of the real influ­ence of these advi­sors. What seems unde­nia­ble, on the con­trary, is that a good and effi­ci­ent comu­ni­ca­tion policy of the cor­po­ra­tion toward their share­hol­ders can over­come an erro­neus or unin­for­med advice from one of these firms or from the most repu­ted eco­no­mic news­pa­per. And a duly inter­pre­ta­tion of the fidu­ciary duties of the insti­tu­tio­nal inves­tors toward their pro­pie­tors also can cor­rect bad coun­sel of these advi­sors. The only thing to do is to ask these advi­sors to do they work well, with care and loyalty. And the ones to ask for it are their princi­pals, i.e., their cli­ents. And is strange to see that are the issu­ers and not the insti­tu­tio­nal inves­tors those who are really con­cer­ned about their work, perhaps because, in fact, the insti­tu­tio­nal inves­tors do not really care about it…
    Wouldn’t it be strange if, for instance, the Ford cor­po­ra­tion would demand the cor­rect repai­ring of their cars by a cer­tain work­shop chain but the owners of the cars would’nt com­p­lain at all? A bad repai­ring harms the Com­pany repu­ta­tion, it’s true, but in the end is the owner who rides the car –and risks his life-…
    I really think that besi­des an increa­sed trans­pa­rency, not much can be done. The dil­li­gence of the issu­ers in giving a full and good infor­ma­tion and, spe­ci­ally, the duty of the insti­tu­tio­nal share­hol­ders in requi­ring and pro­ces­sing that infor­ma­tion can not be limi­ted or out­sour­ced. On the con­trary, must be increa­sed. Any­way, the codi­fi­ca­tion of the duties of care and loyalty of the Proxy advi­sors will always be well­co­med! Let’s stay tuned!

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